Without a Trace: Why did Corona Apps Fail? by White, Lucie & van Basshuysen, Philippe
White L, van Basshuysen P. J Med Ethics 2021;0:1–4. doi:10.1136/medethics-2020-107061     1
Without a trace: Why did corona apps fail?
Lucie White  ,1 Philippe van Basshuysen  1,2
Current controversy
To cite: White L, 
van Basshuysen P. 
J Med Ethics Epub ahead of 
print: [please include Day 
Month Year]. doi:10.1136/
medethics-2020-107061
For numbered affiliations see 
end of article.
Correspondence to
Dr Lucie White, Institut für 
Philosophie, Leibniz Universität 
Hannover, Hannover 30167, 
Germany;  
 lucie. white@ philos. uni- 
hannover. de
Received 9 November 2020
Revised 30 November 2020
Accepted 3 December 2020
© Author(s) (or their 
employer(s)) 2021. Re- use 
permitted under CC BY- NC. No 
commercial re- use. See rights 
and permissions. Published 
by BMJ.
ABSTRACT 
At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, high 
hopes were put on digital contact tracing, using mobile 
phone apps to record and immediately notify contacts 
when a user reports as infected. Such apps can now 
be downloaded in many countries, but as second 
waves of COVID-19 are raging, these apps are playing 
a less important role than anticipated. We argue that 
this is because most countries have opted for app 
configurations that cannot provide a means of rapidly 
informing users of likely infections while avoiding too 
many false positive reports. Mathematical modelling 
suggests that differently configured apps have the 
potential to do this. These require, however, that some 
pseudonymised data be stored on a central server, 
which privacy advocates have cautioned against. We 
contend that their influential arguments are subject 
to two fallacies. First, they have tended to one- sidedly 
focus on the risks that centralised data storage entails 
for privacy, while paying insufficient attention to the fact 
that inefficient contact tracing involves ethical risks too. 
Second, while the envisioned system does entail risks 
of breaches, such risks are also present in decentralised 
systems, which have been falsely presented as ’privacy 
preserving by design’. When these points are understood, 
it becomes clear that we must rethink our approach to 
digital contact tracing in our fight against COVID-19.
INTRODUCTION
After extreme reluctance and delays, at the end of 
October 2020, many European countries have rein-
stituted some level of lockdown measures in order 
to contain the severe second wave of COVID-19 
sweeping across the continent. Cases in other coun-
tries, such as the USA and Russia, are also reaching 
unsurpassed heights.1 During the initial first wave, 
there was a lot of talk about digital contact tracing 
as a potential means of allowing us to emerge from 
lockdown safely, preventing the need for further 
lockdown measures. At this stage, with cases 
spiralling out of control, the hope for this strategy 
seems to be all but lost. We contend that, on the 
contrary, this is the crucial moment to reconsider 
digital contact tracing as a potential means of 
avoiding a continuing cycle of repeated, econom-
ically devastating lockdowns. This, however, will 
involve radically rethinking the way we approach 
contact tracing, and what we are prepared to enter-
tain. More specifically, the seemingly long- resolved 
debate between so called ‘centralised’ and ‘decen-
tralised’ contact tracing apps (in favour of the more 
‘privacy preserving’ decentralised option) needs to 
be reopened. When it comes to COVID-19, the 
speed of contact tracing efforts is critical for the 
success of the measure.2 In order to sufficiently 
speed the process, we contend, we need a centralised 
system which does not require a confirmed test 
before reporting as positive. Although this measure 
has been all but ruled out due to privacy concerns, 
we argue that we need to look at the overall ethical 
risks of each option—the decentralised option, due 
to its inherent delays, has a low chance of success 
and still includes risks. A centralised option also 
involves risks, but shows promise in speeding up 
the process and turning digital contact tracing into 
a more effective measure.
EFFECTIVE DIGITAL CONTACT TRACING
The consensus in mathematical modelling of auto-
mated contact tracing to control the COVID-19 
pandemic is that two factors are absolutely crucial; 
‘population uptake…and timeliness of intervention’.2 
In order to produce an effective means of contact 
tracing, we need to revisit our approach, with these 
two factors in mind. Concerning uptake, we need 
to consider whether the use of contact tracing apps, 
which have not achieved sufficient uptake in many 
countries thus far to put a sufficient dent in the spread 
of the virus, should be incentivised,3 or activated by 
default, while allowing users to opt out,4 or perhaps 
even made mandatory. We wish here, however, to 
focus on the latter factor: speed.
It is clear that speed is of the essence when it 
comes to identifying and quarantining suspected 
cases of COVID-19. It appears that individuals 
become infectious shortly after they themselves are 
infected, and that a substantial degree of virus trans-
mission occurs before the onset of symptoms.5 6 Any 
delay in tracing and quarantining infected persons 
thus means that they are unlikely to be identified 
before they are well into the window of infectious-
ness, in many cases without any indication that 
something is amiss. It is partially for this reason 
that so much attention has been focused on digital 
(as opposed to manual) contact tracing methods, 
which aim to produce a smartphone app that 
can collect information about the user’s contacts, 
and, in the event of (likely) infection, alert these 
contacts instantaneously, replacing ‘a week’s worth 
of manual contact tracing’.7 Various mathematical 
modelling studies indicate that ‘a contact tracing 
strategy will only contribute to containment of 
COVID-19 if it can be organised such that delays 
in the process from symptom onset to isolation of 
the index case and their contacts are very short’,8 
and that ‘delaying contact tracing by even half a day 
from the onset of symptoms can make the differ-
ence between epidemic control and resurgence’.9 i
i It should also be noted that increasing the speed 
and thus efficiency of the app might compen-
sate for lower uptake to a certain degree, 
allowing for outbreak control without requiring 
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A key objective in developing an effective digital contact 
tracing system should, therefore, be increasing the speed of the 
intervention as much as possible. We suggest that in order to do 
this, we need two things—an app that stores some information 
on a centralised server, and that allows for reporting before a 
confirmed test result.ii In order to see why this is, let’s turn to the 
ways in which data can be stored in contact tracing apps.
Centralised versus decentralised
The most popular digital contact tracing app variants use Blue-
tooth signals to gauge when two people with the app come 
into close contact, and for how long. Each person is assigned 
a frequently- changing series of ID- numbers (‘ephemeral iden-
tifiers’). When two people come into close proximity, their 
phones exchange their ephemeral identifiers via Bluetooth. If 
someone reports on the app that they are positive for COVID-
19, anyone who has this person’s ephemeral identifiers stored on 
their phone (and meets the conditions of ‘close contact’) during 
the period of infection can be instantaneously alerted.
These apps are often divided into two camps, depending on 
where information is stored. In a so- called ‘decentralised’ app, 
ephemeral identifiers are generated on the user’s own smart-
phone and exchanged directly between users when they come into 
contact. When an index case registers as positive, his ephemeral 
identifiers for the period of infection are uploaded to a central 
server, and broadcast to all other app users. Anyone who has one 
of the index case’s ephemeral identifiers stored will be alerted. In 
a ‘centralised’ app, each user is assigned a permanent identifier, 
which is stored on a central server. The server then creates ephem-
eral identifiers for each user and sends them to the user’s phone. 
Phones exchange ephemeral identifiers, and when a user registers 
as positive, the ephemeral identifiers of his contactsiii are sent to 
the central server. These are then matched with their permanent 
identifier, and the corresponding contact is alerted.10
The centralised app’s storage of a permanent identifier for 
each user provides us with a way to speed up the contact tracing 
process significantly. The reason for this can be drawn out by 
looking at a problem for digital contact tracing: How do we 
make sure that positive reports from users are accurate? There 
are two options here. The first (which many countries with both 
decentralised and centralised apps opt for) is to require a posi-
tive test before it is possible to report as positive in the app.11 12 
This is clearly a good way to ensure that reports are accurate, but 
it leads to delays in reporting. Although testing turnaround times 
are rapidly reducing in some countries, the wait between expe-
riencing symptoms, accessing a test, and receiving the results 
could undermine the success of the measure.
The other option is to allow users to self- report that they are 
positive for COVID-19 as soon as they experience symptoms. 
This would speed up the process enough to make the success of 
the measure much more likely, but we are then hit with the risk 
that the system will become flooded with false positive reports,13 
either because users are genuinely mistaken, or because of 
malicious reporting. This would result in many contacts being 
falsely quarantined, possibly sending us back into conditions 
approaching a general lockdown. We could require that positive 
self- reports are followed up with a test within a certain window 
made mandatory) proportion of the population to use it.4 
ii This type of system was originally proposed by Ferretti et al.7 
and Hinch et al.9
iii Rather than the user’s own identifiers, as in the decentralised 
app.
of time, allowing for the rapid release of unnecessarily quaran-
tined contacts, but this will only work if every user can quickly 
and easily access a test, and if users are sufficiently diligent to 
voluntarily seek a test and submit a follow- up report quickly. It 
seems, in sum, very difficult to sort the false from the true posi-
tives in a system that allows for self- reporting.
The need for centralised data storage
It is here that the permanent identifiers stored by the central 
server become crucial. These give us a way to distinguish the 
(likely) false from the (likely) true positives when no follow- up 
test is forthcoming. In a centralised system, where the permanent 
identifiers of users can be associated with each other, the server 
can keep track of whether a positive report is followed by further 
positive reports from the people with whom the index case has 
been in contact. Where an initial positive report is not followed 
by further positive reports, the index case could be identified by 
the server as a likely false positive, and all his contacts could be 
rapidly released from quarantine. Such a measure is not possible 
in a decentralised system, because there is no way to keep track 
of who has been in contact with whom over time—the server 
only holds the ephemeral identifiers of infected persons during 
their period of infection, and each smartphone only holds the 
ephemeral identifiers of direct contacts. There is no way to get an 
overview of clusters of infections, and thus see where no cluster 
results from an initial report, indicating a likely false positive.
There are three things that should be noted about this 
proposed system. The first is that the process of identifying clus-
ters (or the lack of one) can take place without directly identi-
fying any individual user—this can all proceed on the basis of 
assigning each user in a centralised app a permanent pseudon-
ymous identifier. This, however, leads to concerns that users 
will be easier to unmask in a centralised system than in a decen-
tralised one, as we shall see below. The second is that nothing 
like this kind of system has actually been implemented in real life 
thus far. The centralised systems initially trialled in the UK and 
Australia were abandoned after they could not identify contacts 
with sufficient accuracy14 15—not due to an inherent problem 
with the system, but as a result of the difficulty of designing a 
functional app on Android and iPhones without the support of 
Apple and Google (who only support decentralised app archi-
tectures). The centralised system in France has been plagued 
by low uptake, and requires a positive test before reporting is 
possible.12 16 Thus, the systems developed so far have not taken 
full advantage of the opportunity offered by digital tools for 
effective contact tracing. Third, it should be noted that digital 
contact tracing alone, even as envisioned here, which has the 
potential to improve on systems currently in operation, will not 
suffice to curb the pandemic. Rather, it should be embedded in 
a comprehensive strategy that includes testing and ensuring that 
individuals do self- quarantine when alerted by the app, which 
may require removing disincentives related to missing work, 
among other things.iv
ETHICAL RISKS
So far we have shown that the likelihood of an app being effective 
can be increased by storing some of the users’ data on a central 
server. However, as advocates of decentralised systems are quick 
to point out, storing user data on a central server entails risks of 
breaches. As we noted, no individual user is directly identifiable 
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on the central server (they are identified with a pseudonym). 
But many developers and defenders of a decentralised app are 
concerned that it would be too easy for governments to use the 
information provided to identify individuals and expand the 
system,17–19 allowing the government to surveil its citizens, and 
potentially pass this information on to law enforcement or use 
it for other purposes.17 It is also possible that information on a 
centralised server could be accessed by a hacker.17
Advocates of decentralised systems not only point out that 
centralised systems entail risks of breaches; they also contend 
that these risks are prevented in decentralised systems, which 
are ‘privacy preserving by design’.17 This putative advantage of 
decentralised systems can be compared with a principle from 
safety engineering, namely that of ‘inherently safe design’. This 
refers to the practice of eliminating potential hazard, rather 
than merely containing it.20 For instance, a design using fire-
proof materials instead of inflammable ones is inherently safe, 
whereas using inflammable materials while preventing a major 
fire through a sprinkler system would constitute a ‘secondary 
prevention’. Other things being equal, inherently safe design is 
preferable to secondary prevention because even if secondary 
prevention is installed, the hazard is still present, and thus the 
unwanted outcome can still be triggered through some series of 
events (eg, the sprinkler system might be destroyed through some 
unanticipated event, and a major fire might occur); whereas this 
possibility is ruled out if the hazard is entirely removed.21
Advocates of decentralised systems can then be understood 
as arguing that, by minimising the amount of centrally stored 
data, decentralised apps are inherently safe (‘privacy preserving 
by design’). Centralised apps, in contrast, are in need of a sprin-
kler system—regulations preventing the misuse of data and 
their effective enforcement—but such secondary preventions 
are prone to error and thus involve ethical risk, namely possible 
breaches, caused either by government abuse or by a hacker. 
Because decentralised systems do not involve this risk, they 
are preferable. As we will show next, this argument cannot be 
sustained. There are two reasons for this: first, inherent safety 
is only preferable to secondary prevention if it minimises overall 
ethical risk, but decentralised systems entail considerable ethical 
risks as they are less likely to be effective; second, it is not true 
that decentralised systems are inherently safe. Taken together, 
these arguments provide reason to think that, if equipped with 
suitable secondary prevention, centralised systems could mini-
mise overall ethical risk.
Ethical risks are unavoidable
Safety engineering does not require that inherent safety always 
be realised. Inherent safety may reduce the likelihood that the 
purpose of a given design be achieved, or it may even entirely 
preclude the achievement of this purpose, such as when a 
hazardous element is an essential part of the system, as in the case 
of nuclear power plants.20 In such cases, secondary prevention is 
preferable if this allows the achievement of the design purpose 
while sufficiently minimising the risks. We have argued that a 
centralised design increases the likelihood of effective contact 
tracing, and we may thus be in a situation where a centralised 
design is preferable, if its associated risks of breaches can be 
sufficiently minimised through secondary preventions.
There is reason to think that they can. In many countries, 
data pertaining to health are among the most strictly regu-
lated, and in many places, such as some US states, legislation 
has been introduced specifically preventing information gath-
ered by COVID-19 contact tracing efforts from being shared 
for non- public health purposes under any circumstances.22 The 
Provincial Court of British Colombia in Canada similarly blocked 
the sharing of information pertaining to an HIV- infected person 
with law enforcement, accepting that the ‘compelled disclosure 
of confidential information would undermine the ability (to 
pursue) effective treatment of HIV and endanger the lives of 
HIV- positive persons, thereby placing at risk the health interests 
of the population as a whole’.23
This is all to say that, just as sprinkler systems can be an effec-
tive means of preventing a fire, whether the information gath-
ered by contact tracing can be shared, and with whom, can be 
successfully regulated. As with any secondary prevention, risks 
of breaches cannot be eliminated entirely. However, it should be 
noted that the alternatives are also not risk- free. Decentralised 
apps, even if they were privacy- preserving (which we argue 
below is not the case), entail considerable ethical risks as they are 
less likely to be effective in containing the pandemic, and failing 
to do so will involve harm (loss of lives, economic damage etc.). 
Furthermore, alternative means of fighting the pandemic, such 
as selectively locking down the elderly, involve ethical risks too, 
as they severely discriminate against the elderly.24 In our fight 
against the pandemic, there are no risk- free options.
Decentralised systems are not inherently safe
The second fallacy of the above- stated defence of decentralised 
systems stems from the assumption that these systems are inher-
ently safe (‘privacy preserving by design’). Cryptographers have 
noted that both centralised and decentralised systems are vulner-
able to hacking attacks, but their vulnerabilities differ.10 25 A 
major concern for centralised systems is that a hacker might be 
able to identify app users through their centrally stored perma-
nent pseudonymous identifiers, as well as the identities of the 
people they have been in contact with. Serge Vaudenay argues 
that such an attack would be difficult to achieve, and would 
probably require a malicious government authority to store addi-
tional information as an app user registers in order to make iden-
tification possible.10 Others, such as Richard Baskerville et al., 
emphasise that highly integrated systems in general have fewer, 
controllable vulnerability points, and can thus be expected to 
allow for better auditing. At the same time, increased integra-
tion means that they are more severely affected if compromised, 
as breaches affect all integrated functions.26 In the context of 
contact tracing, we might thus expect breaches to be more likely 
in dispersed decentralised systems while being less likely but 
more severe in more integrated centralised systems.
The kinds of breaches we should be concerned about in 
decentralised systems are attacks that could expose the iden-
tities of infected users. When a user of a decentralised system 
reports that he is infected with COVID-19, all of his ephem-
eral identifiers are uploaded to the central server, where they 
are accessible to everyone. This makes it possible to record the 
ephemeral identifiers broadcasted by particular users, and then 
to check them later against the identifiers stored on the server. 
This would enable the identification of those that have become 
infected.27 Such attacks, Vaudenay contends, could be conducted 
by any tech- savvy user, and ‘are undetectable, can be done at 
a wide scale, and…proposed countermeasures are, at best, able 
to mitigate attacks in a limited number of scenarios.’ Attacks 
on centralised systems, on the other hand, can be better identi-
fied and mitigated ‘by accounting and auditing’. Vaudenay even 
suggests that privacy- conscious users would in fact be less likely 
to report that they are infected in a decentralised system than a 
centralised one. Vaudenay also notes that information stored in 
a decentralised manner could be utilised by law enforcement—
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captured an ephemeral identifier, suspects could have their 
phones inspected for 2 weeks to find evidence.’ Because one’s 
own ephemeral identifiers are stored on one’s phone in a decen-
tralised system, access to someone’s phone would yield more 
information than under a centralised system.
It follows from these arguments that it would be false to 
see decentralised systems as inherently safe design, or ‘privacy 
preserving’. Rather, both centralised and decentralised systems 
entail risks of different kinds of breaches. Our evaluation of 
these risks should then be sensitive to the question of how much 
they are worth taking: if a technology has only a small chance of 
being effective, there is reason to be wary of its associated risks 
(and cognisant of the risks of opting for an inefficient means of 
preventing significant harm); while if a technology has a higher 
chance of preventing significant harm, the level of risk we 
should be prepared to accept should arguably be higher. As we 
have argued in the previous section, centralised apps are more 
likely to be an effective means in our fight against the pandemic. 
Given the potential risks and benefits of each option, we need 
to revisit the assumption that decentralised apps are clearly ethi-
cally superior.
CONCLUSION
Concerns about privacy have dominated the debate about digital 
contact tracing. While these concerns are legitimate, this debate 
has ignored the fact that the failure of a system being effective 
involves ethical risks too. We have argued that the effective-
ness of contact- tracing apps can be enhanced if we embrace a 
‘centralised’ app architecture, in which users’ permanent pseud-
onymous identifiers are stored on a central server. While this 
involves risks of breaches, these risks can be minimised through 
‘secondary prevention measures’. Moreover, risks of breaches 
are also present in decentralised systems, which have been falsely 
presented as ‘privacy preserving by design’. Of course, issues 
concerning implementation of the proposed strategy remain; a 
critical aspect of this will be to properly address and assuage the 
privacy concerns that have led Apple and Google, and much of 
the public at large, to regard centralised architectures with suspi-
cion.16 28 But the considerations outlined here do serve to make 
clear that we must revise some of the most prominent assump-
tions underlying the debate on digital contact tracing.
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